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Abstract. It has been shown that humans are heavily influenced by peers when it
comes to choice of behavior, norms or opinions. In order to better understand and
help to predict society’s behavior, it is therefore desirable to design social simu-
lations that incorporate representations of those network aspects. We address this
topic, by investigating the performance of a coordination game mechanism in rep-
resenting the diffusion of behavior for distinct data sets and diverse behaviors in
children and adolescent social networks. We introduce a set of quality measure-
ments in order to assess the adequacy of our simulations and find evidence that a
coordination game environment could underlie some of the diffusion processes,
while other processes may not be modeled coherently as a coordination game.
1 Introduction
Christakis and Fowler [1] suggest that our social contacts heavily influence our deci-
sions, opinions and and behavior. By proposing new approaches to tackle existing prob-
lems in crowd behavior, these findings may be helpful for people that aim to understand,
guide or control the behavior of societies. For example, the knowledge that the political
opinions of spouses strongly affect each other seems to be of high value to politicians
during election periods. Physicians and other health care professionals could use the
findings that adolescents affect each other’s smoking, drinking and sexual-interaction
behavior. Thus, the existing research on contagion of behavior and spread of informa-
tion within social networks can give good hints for campaigns and political action in
order to achieve a desirable behavior. Current research proves that such influence exist
and is also able to point out situations where the effects are stronger or weaker. However,
to adequately model the effects of contagion and information spreading for simulation
and prediction models, a coherent representation is required. This is the motivation of
the work presented below. Our research implements the contagion of behavior within
friendship networks as a coordination game [2] [3] where single individuals within the
observed systems coordinate their actions with their neighbors. We assume that indi-
viduals benefit from compliant behavior.We adapt the coordination game mechanism
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to two different data sets, each containing information about friendship ties, as well as
time-dependent information about specific behaviors or behavioral outcomes. To eval-
uate the performance of the implementation of the coordination game, we simulate the
coordination dynamics on the given friendship network starting with the real initial sit-
uation and subsequently compare the state of the system after the simulation with the
state observable in reality after one or more time-steps.
Synopsis. We review the state of relevant research regarding diffusion of behavior and
information in Social Networks and present the data sets used within this work in
Sect. 2. Sect. 3 presents the implementation of the coordination game and its adap-
tion to the different data sets while Sect. 4 contains experimental setup and results. We
discuss the experimental results in Sect. 5 and conclude with Sect. 6.
2 Background
2.1 Diffusion processes in Social Networks
Existing research indicates that human decisions, opinions, norms and behavior are in-
fluenced by the social environment [4]. Social influence and contagion as well as spread
of behavior and information through social networks has been documented in a wide
range of cases [1]. For instance diffusion of voting behavior [1] and obesity [5] has been
proven statistically. Moreover, cooperative behavior has been shown to be contagious,
though depending on tie structure and dynamics [6] and recent studies revealed con-
tagiousness of emotions [7]. Other behaviors do not spread like sexual orientation [8].
This indicates the existence of those effects on other individual behaviors of children
and adolescents such as “commitment to school education”, substance use or sport.
Marques [9] reveals the huge differences between social networks of the poor and those
of more wealthy people. Considering the above, this further encourages the modeling
and simulation of social network effects in order to understand social phenomena and
to guide political decision making. Related research has also been conducted in chil-
dren and adolescent networks. For instance roles of nodes within a network of school
children have already been identified [10] and diffusion of social norms and harass-
ment behavior in adolescents school networks have been empirically studied and evi-
denced [11]. It then has been reasonably shown that behavior, norms information and
opinions flow within social networks of adults and children. Approaches to model this
diffusion come for example from the field of Social Psychology, like the concept of So-
cial Influence Network Theory [12] from Friedkin. Another approach is the modeling
as a coordination game [2] [3]. Those models may be considered as advanced threshold
models [13] [14] [15] that incorporate social network structure instead of simple crowd
behavior. The coordination game as implemented in [3] is characterized by the assump-
tion that individuals benefit when their behavior matches the behavior of their neighbors
in the network. Hereby a node within a network can adopt one of two behaviors A or
B. The node receives pay-off a when equaling its behavior with a neighbor that adopts
behaviorA. b respectively denotes the pay-off a node receives when both, her and her
neighbor adopt behaviorB. When choosing different behaviors, nodes receive a pay-
off of 0 (other implementations may introduce negative pay-offs for non compliance).
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The total pay-off for each node can accordingly be calculated as presented in 1 and 2.
Here P ai denotes the total pay-off for node i from choosing behavior A (respectively
Behavior B for P bi ), di denotes the degree of node i and n
a
i (same for n
b
i ) denotes the
number of neighbors of node i adopting behavior A (respectively Behavior B).
P ai = an
a
i (1)
P bi = b(di − n
b
i ) (2)
This determines that the best strategy for node i is to choose behavior A if nai ≥ bdi
and behavior B otherwise. Rearranging the inequality in 3 , we get:







In the absence of knowledge of the individual pay-offs a and b, a global threshold T
may be found experimentally, as shown in the remainder of this paper.
2.2 Data
We perform our experiments on two different data sets, both contain information about
adolescent friendship ties, as well as about different types of behavior.
(i) The first data set stems from the study ’Determinantes do desempenho escolar na
rede de ensino fundamental do Recife’ [16]. The survey was conducted by Fundac¸a˜o
Joaquim Nabuco (FUNDAJ) in 2013, gathering data from more than 4000 pupils in
public schools in the North-Eastern Brazilian city Recife. Those data contain among
others the social network of the pupils and their performance in the subject maths at
the beginning and at the end of the year. Children were asked to nominate their 5 best
friends. In this way, a network containing 4191 students was generated. However, 573
students that did not nominate any friend within their class were removed from the data
set, leading to a total number of 3618 vertices.
(ii) The second data set is a selection of 50 girls from the social network data collected
in the Teenage Friends and Lifestyle Study[17]. Here the friendship network, as well
as behavior in sports and substance use of students from a school in Scotland were
surveyed. The survey started in 1995 and continued for three years until 1997. Students
were 13 years old when the study started. The study counted 160 participants of whom
129 participated during the whole study. The friendship networks were surveyed asking
the pupils to name up to twelve friends. Pupils were also asked to report their behavior
related to, sports, smoking as well as alcohol and cannabis consumption.
3 Diffusion of behavior modeled as a Coordination Game
We model the imitation of behavior of neighbors within the friendship network accord-
ing to the coordination game as presented in Sect. 2. As indicated in Sect 2, we posses
no information about possible pay-offs a and b or eventual costs of transition and hence
hence aim to find the threshold GT experimentally. This means that a vertex within the
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network changes its state over time depending on the state of its neighbors. For sim-
plicity, the vertices may adopt one of two different states according to the investigated
behavior. Hereby one state indicates that the vertex adapted behavior A, the other pos-
sible state indicates the adaption of behavior B. For each iteration, the current ratio ri is
being calculated. Here ai denotes the number of neighbors of node i that adapt behavior





If the perceived ratio ri is higher than the global threshold GT and the state of node i
is B , the node changes its behavior towards Behavior A. Conversely, if ri is below GT
and Node i′s behavior is A, it changes its behavior towards B. Due to differences in
data representation, the coordination game had to be implemented slightly differently
for the two settings, as follows.
3.1 FUNDAJ
The only information available for more than one moment in time of the FUNDAJ sur-
vey is the mark of the pupils in the subject maths for the beginning and the end of the
year. Although marks are not a behavior in themselves, they stem among others from
individual behavior such as doing homework, paying attention, studying frequently etc.
Marks are therefore considered a good indicator for the behavior engagement at school.
They are represented as numeric values between 0 and 100. In order to differentiate be-
tween two behaviors, students are classified as good students or bad students according
to their mark. Students whose mark lies below the threshold tm are thereby classified
as bad students and vice-versa. The setting of tm defines hereby the number of good
students (positives) and bad students(negatives) and hence affects heavily if nodes are
predominantly connected to positives or negatives. High values for tm generate large
numbers of bad students and smaller numbers of good students and vice versa. The
ratio ri from Equation 4 is being calculated for each student at each iteration of the
simulation. If required, the mark for the next time stepmi+1 is being multiplied by the
factor 1 + f in order to alternate the state of the node:
mi+1 = mi ∗ (1 + f) (5)
Parameter GT sets the affinity of the nodes to change behavior. Thus, depending on
the proportions of positives and negatives, it either yields a volatile or a stable sys-
tem. Adaption parameter f also influences the stability of the system, where volatility
increases with increasing values of f .
3.2 Scottish Dataset
The Scottish data set contains information about four different behaviors, which are
practicing sports, drug (cannabis) use, alcohol use and smoking behavior. Characteristic
values differ slightly for the distinct behaviors, as there are for example two increments
representing the intensity of sports but four increments for drug use intensity. Thus, we
Vclassified the characteristic values in order to obtain a simplified two status situation.
Tab. 1 presents the characteristic values and their classification as Behavior A, all other
values are accordingly classified as Behavior B. In contrast to the FUNDAJ data, the
Table 1: Classification of characteristic values for behavior
Behavior Characteristic values Class. as Behavior A if:
Sports 1 (non regular); 2 (regular) ≥ 2
Drugs 1 (non), 2 (tried once), 3 (occasional) and 4 (regular) ≥ 2
Alcohol 1 (non), 2 (once or twice a year), 3 (once a month), 4
(once a week) and 5 (more than once a week)
≥ 2
Smoke 1 (non), 2 (occasional) and 3 (more than once a week) ≥ 2
representation of behavior by discrete values required a slightly different imitation pro-
cess. Hence, for the Scottish data set, if a vertex changes its state, it respectively raises
the behavior value by 1 if it aims to adopt behavior A or, decreases the behavior value
by 1 if it aims to adopt behavior B. Information is available for three consecutive years.
Hence the starting value for each vertex in the coordination game is its behavior in year
one. The quality of the simulation is measured comparing the state of the simulation
after a certain number of iterations with the state of the real system after two years,
here referred to as benchmark t+1 or after three years, denominated as benchmark t+2.
Moreover, the friendship network of the girls in the study has been surveyed for each
of the three years, the study lasted. This yields the three slightly different networks g1
at the first survey,g2 after one year and g3 after two years.This implicated for the simu-
lation that the neighbors that a vertex considers for the calculation of its state vary for
each year t according to the network gt In order to incorporate those network dynamics
into the simulation, we changed the network used to define the adjacent vertices of a
node after completing 50% of iterations. experiments indicated that network combina-
tion of g1 as representation for the friendship network in period between year 1 and
year 2, and g2 representing the friendship network in the period from year 2 to year 3,
outperformed the results for network combination (g2, g3). Hence, we assume that the
more appropriate network combination is the former. Therefore experiments and results
presented in the remainder of this paper refer to network combination (g1, g2).
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
Experiments were run for the two coordination game settings with varying parameters
in order to find a parameter setting that leads to plausible results. As for the simulation
with FUNDAJ data, the simulation was conducted with all combinations of the parame-
tersGT (global threshold) and f (adaption parameter) forGT, f ∈ [0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1]
and tm (classification of marks) with tm ∈[20,40,60,80]. For simulations with the Scot-
tish data set the parameter GT was set to values GT ∈ [0.0, 0.05, 0.1, · · · , 1.0].
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4.2 Quality measurement
In order to assess the quality of the respective simulation, four distinct quality measures
were applied: (i) match quality, (ii) ROC-curves (iii) graph-based quality measures and
(iv) average estimation error.
(i) The most intuitive measure for the simulation quality is to compare the state of each
vertex vs after a certain number of simulation iterations with its state in reality vr in
benchmark t+1 or benchmark t+2. Hereby, we denote the case when vs = vr asmatch
and accordingly the case vs 6=vr as miss − match. This quality measure is named
match− quality and denoted as q for the rest of this work. The match quality q of the






However, for skewed attribute distributions, this measure favors estimates with high
numbers of positive or respectively negative estimates and hence fails to mirror the
quality of the simulation when the distribution of attributes is skewed.
(ii) The ROC-metric [18] sets the number of true positives (Recall) in relation to the
number of false positives (Fallout). Recall is the ratio of correctly estimated positives
values, the true−positives and the total number of positive values np. Fallout denotes
the ratio between wrongly estimated positive values false − positives and the total









The ROC-curve displays respectivelyRecall values for each simulation on the ordinate
and Fallout values on the abscissa. Values above the diagonal of the graph indicate the
existence of a signal and values below the diagonal may be interpreted as noise. Thus,
this metric provides a clearer picture of simulation quality. Best estimates can be found
mathematically maximizing the Y ouden− Index [19] y as presented in 9.
y = Recall − Fallout (9)
(iii) For global analysis it might not be necessary to simulate the state of each vertex
correctly, as long as the system state can be predicted adequately. Thus, as third qual-
ity measure, behavior distribution in friendship-patterns was implemented. Hereby we
define friendship patterns in the network using a modified version of NEGOPY [20].
According to NEGOPY, we define vertex types as isolate, dyad, liaison, and group
member. As we deal with undirected networks, we do not classify tree-nodes. Accord-
ing to Richards, an isolate is an individual with at maximum one friend. Two persons
connected only to each other are denoted as dyad. Liaisons are individuals with more
than 50% connections to members of different groups. Liaisons can also be nodes that
are mostly connected to other liaisons and with less than 50% links to group members.
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A composition of minimum three individuals is referred to as group, if the individuals
share more than 50% of their linkage, build a connected component and stay connected
if up to 10% of the group members are removed. For measuring the quality, the number
of positive vertices n
p
k in each friendship-pattern class k is calculated after each iter-
ation of the simulation. Subsequently, the error ek is calculated as difference between
n
p
k of simulated and real values. The average− error e denotes the weighted average









(iv) The average estimation error ǫ assesses the average difference between simulated
values for behavior and real behavioral outcomes. Here n denotes the total number of
nodes in the simulation, while the difference between simulation and reality for node i








This subsection presents the results from the experiments presented earlier. We first
present results for the experiments with FUNDAJ data and subsequently report results
for experiments with the Scottish data set.
Results - FUNDAJ Figure 1 presents the results for simulations with FUNDAJ data for
15 iterations. Figure 1(a) contains ROC-curves for the experimental results with varying
settings of tm, GT , and f . For each investigated value of mark threshold tm, the Fig-
ure illustrates an individual ROC-curve. The dashed lines indicate the ROC-level of the
respective setting for tm before starting the simulation. Thus only parameter settings
leading to ROC-values situated above the respective dashed line can be considered as
settings that improve the quality of the simulation. The colored lines in Fig. 1(b) rep-
resent the development of quality indicators q and e for distinct parameter settings and
also indicate the average estimation error ǫ during the run-time of the simulation.
The results with the highest Y ouden−Index in simulations with FUNDAJ data set are
indicated by arrows pointing from the respective parameter settings for mark-threshold
tm, global threshold GT and adaption parameter f in parentheses as (tm,GT ,f ) in
Fig. 1(a). The results for q, e and ǫ of those most promising parameter settings are
presented in Fig 1(b) and 1(c). The more detailed analysis of the five parameter settings
that were performing best in ROC-curve analysis in Fig. 1(b) yields increasing e and
increasing estimation error ǫ while q continuously decreases. However, as presented
in Fig. 1(c) the second best performing parameter settings from ROC-curve analysis
lead in general to a decay of e and significant growth of q whereas at least one setting
(80,0.2,0.4) also decreases estimation error ǫ slightly.
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(a) ROC-Curve FUNDAJ
(b) Analysis FUNDAJ-f = 0.2 (c) Analysis FUNDAJf = 0.4
Fig. 1: ROC-Curve and Analysis for Coordination Game simulations with FUNDAJ
data - 15 iterations; For varying threshold marks tm, classifying the pupils as good
students, if their mark is greater then tm or bad students if their performance is below
tm and for varying settings of GT and f , as pointed out in parentheses (tm,GT ,f ).
Recall = true−positives
np
; Fallout = false−positives
nn
.
Results - Scottish data Figure 2 illustrates the results for experiments with the Scottish
data set for 50 iterations for each of the investigated behaviors. The solid lines in Fig.
2(a) illustrate theRecall-Fallout relation for varying parameter settings and for differ-
ent behaviors. The black diagonal line in this graph indicatesRecall-Fallout ratios that
represent random processes, while the dashed lines indicate the ROC-level of the start
situation. Since experiments with Scottish data were run with two different networks
as explained in Sect. 3, analysis of q, e and ǫ in Fig. 2(b), 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e) contain
blue lines, indicating the values calculated in relation to t+1 and red lines, representing
the results calculated in relation to benchmark t+2. ROC-curve for the simulation of
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diffusion of behavior sport in Fig. 2(a) is very close to the diagonal of the graph, indi-
cating that the simulation is rather a random process. Furthermore ROC-values cannot
reach the ROC-level before starting the simulation indicated by the dashed line. How-
ever, there are two values for t that yield ROC-values above the diagonal of which t =
0.55 generates the most promising results. Hence, q, e and ǫ development are analyzed
over the whole run time in Fig. 2(b). It is observable, that e in t + 1 indicated by the
blue line decreases significantly until the 25th iteration, which is when the network gt
is replaced by network gt+1. After the 25th iteration, e in t + 2 decreases heavily. ǫ
decreases slightly for benchmark t + 2 but increases if compared to benchmark t + 1.
Although decreasing for the first five iterations, q remains stable during the following
20 iterations and slightly improves after 25 iterations.
ROC-curve for smoking behavior in Fig. 2(a) yields positive results for t 0.35, 0.4
and 0.45, significantly outperforming the initial ROC-value indicated by the dashed
line. A deeper examination of q,e and ǫ development during run time in Fig. 2(c) shows
that as compared with benchmark t+1 neither q, nor e or ǫ develop positively. Though,
compared with benchmark t + 2 a strong improvement of q, as well as a significant
decrease of e and a slight decrease of ǫ is observable.
The t values indicated by the ROC-curve for Alcohol-use in Fig. 2(a) do not reach
initial ROC-level and yield decreasing q and increasing e until the underlying network
is changed after 25 iterations, initiating a slight improvement of those values for both
benchmark values as presented in Fig. 2(d). Nevertheless, q never reaches a value higher
than the start value, also e does not drop under its start value and ǫ remains on an equal
level. ROC-curve for Drug-use in Fig. 2(a) yields positive results for t 0.35, 0.4 and
0.45, slightly exceeding the initial ROC-value. Figure 2(e) presents decreasing e and ǫ,
as well as increasing q over the run time for benchmark value t + 2, while all quality
measures develop negatively for benchmark t+ 1.
5 Discussion
5.1 FUNDAJ data set
As pointed out in Sect. 4, the parameter setting (80,0.2,0.4) performs best as under this
setting average-error e is being more than halved (approximately 75%). For this setting
also match quality q increases slightly, ǫ shows a small decay, and Y ouden − Index
improves. This indicates that the setting reasonably approximates the real system state.
However, simulation is not very adequate in estimating the individual behavior. Thus
we argue that diffusion of marks can be reasonably modeled as a coordination game
if the researcher is willing to disregard individual states and is interested in the global
state of the network instead. Results further indicate that 15 iterations under the given
parameter setting are good for approximating one school year.
5.2 Scottish data set
Simulating the coordination-game spread for behavior sport with GT = 0.55 yields a
relatively small Y ouden− Index and cannot improve the ROC-level of the initial situ-
ation. However, the development of average− error for benchmark t+1 and t+2 yield
X(a) ROC-Curves Scottish Data
(b) Analysis Sport - GT = 0.55 (c) Analysis Smoking - GT = 0.45
(d) Analysis Alcohol - GT = 0.65 (e) Analysis Drugs - GT = 0.35
Fig. 2: ROC-curves and Analysis for Coordination Game simulations with Scottish data
set - 50 iterations. For varying behaviors and for varying settings of GT . Recall =
true−positives
np
; Fallout = false−positives
nn
.
improvement of the overall state of the network, while decreasing match − quality q
and increasing ǫ for both benchmarks. Although improving the estimation of the gen-
eral network state, setting GT = 0.55 cannot improve the estimation quality and can
therefore not be considered a good setting for GT .
As for simulating the spread of behavior smoke throughout the given network, we
found strong evidence for the suitability of parameter GT = 0.35, 0.4 and 0.45 in the
ROC-curve. Run time analysis of e, ǫ and q indicate that the parameter setting when
run on network g1 cannot reproduce the spreading during the first year, since the for-
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mer grows while the latter declines for the first 25 iterations. However considering
benchmarks t+2 and network g2, all three quality indicators support the hypothesis that
spreading occurs as a coordination game with t = 0.35, 0.4 or 0.45. Recall, that chil-
dren were around age 13 when the study started, this discrepancy may be explained by
the nature of the behavior smoking, which probably has a higher attraction to children
aged 14 to 15 than to children aged 12 to 13. Similar but not as striking evidence can
be found when examining behavior drug − use. As drug − use has been explicitly
surveyed as the use of cannabis, this seems coherent, since tobacco use does commonly
precede cannabis use. Conversely, for the behavior alcohol− use, results are not clear.
ROC-curves indicate that parameter settings yielding reasonable estimates of the real
situation exist. Yet, run time analysis of those cases show that those promising param-
eter settings do not lead to an improvement of the estimation. Hence, we argue that for
alcohol-use we cannot find evidence that spreading of behavior can be modeled as a
coordination game within the given data set. This might also be related to the age of
the students, since parents influence might be stronger during this period. Additionally
due to the restriction of available data to female students the lack of spreading could be
gender related.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we adopted the coordination-game mechanism for simulating the spread-
ing process of behavior throughout social networks. We ran the simulation on two dif-
ferent data sets, the FUNDAJ study with school children from metropolitan area of
Recife and the study from Scottish female pupils. We investigated the spread of behav-
ior “commitment to school education” represented by the marks of the pupils in the
FUNDAJ study, as well as the behaviors “Substance use” for tobacco, drugs and alco-
hol and the behavior “practicing sports” as surveyed in the Scottish data set. We found
good indications that a coordination-game mechanism underlies the spread of behavior
“commitment to school education” as well as “smoking” and “drug-use” but could not
find comparable evidence for behavior “Alcohol-use”. Results for behavior “practicing
sports” were not clear. We argue that the missing evidence for behavior “Alcohol-use”
may stem from the nature of the data set, since surveyed individuals were below 16
years of age until the end of the survey. Moreover only female pupils participated. Since
male adolescents are more susceptible to early alcohol-use, this could be an explanation
for the lack of evidence, for that particular aspect.
This work serves as a first step in simulating the spread of behavior throughout so-
cial networks, since it provides evidence that (1) there is an underlying game-environment
for the agents within the social system (2) that it can be modeled as a coordination game.
However, the players of this game, the bounded rational agents [21] might be equipped
with decision finding mechanisms that better approximate human decision making.
Though driving the social systems from a real start situation towards the state in re-
ality after one or respectively two years, the investigated deterministic mechanism still
lead to a considerable difference between the real and the simulated system. Hence, we
argue that the deterministic mechanism is not fully capable to simulate human bounded
rationality and the lack of information humans face within their decision process. Be-
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sides this, eventual noise within the data and external influences may not be represented
by a deterministic mechanism. Future work should therefore deal with the creation of
a heuristic decision mechanism for the individual agents, that better represents human
decision making within a coordination-game setting. In addition, a binary behavioral
variable is an extreme simplification for the on continuous scales measured nuances
of human behavior such as sports activities, drug- and alcohol consumption or school
performance. It is therefore desirable to investigate how more complex scaling systems
influence the outcomes of this research. Furthermore, inter-temporal components shall
be introduced, representing an “aging” of relations and behaviors, modifying the in-
fluence of neighbors according to the “age” of the friendship, as well as according to
the past behavior of the neighbor. In the same sense, friendship weights may be mod-
ified according to the position of friends within the individual networks since people
may tend to follow “role models”. Finally, the presented mechanism must be applied to
different data sets in order to empirically verify the results.
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